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CASE NO. 6295 
In the Supreme Court of 
'The State of Utah 
STELLA FELICE GIGLIOTTI, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEOPOLDO ALBERGO, 
Defendant and Respondent. J 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District, in and for Carbon County, 
State of Utah. 
HONORABLE GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, Judge. 
Respondent's CBrief 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action was brought by the appellant to quiet title 
to certain real property in Carbon County. It is important 
at the outset to note the allegation in plaintiff's complaint 
as to the ti tie she claimed at the time of bringing the action 
and to bear said claim in mind throughout the arguments. 
Said allegation of her claim is as follows: 
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"2. That the plaintiff is now the holder and 
owner in fee simple and in possession and entitled 
to the possession of that certain piece or parcel of 
real property lying" etc. 
This was the allegation that the defendant, respond-
ent herein, was required to defend against. 
Appellant states in part on page 1 of her brief, as fol-
lows: 
"In the main, this court is called upon to de-
termine the rights of a wife of a party defendant 
to a foreclosure suit omitted therefrom as a party 
defendant and regardless of her deed, had an in-
choate interest in the property sought to be fore-
closed." 
This claim is apparently based on the theory that 
because she is and was the wife of Ross Gigliotti she has 
an inchoate interest in the property in the nature of or 
similar to a dower interest. This is right in the teeth of 
her complaint because certainly if she is "the owner in fee 
simple" of the property in question she has no such "in-
choate interest" in the nature of or similar to a dower in-
terest. 
She then comes back in her reply and claims a home-
stead in the property in question. If the allegations of her 
complaint are true that she is "the owner in fee simple" 
and that her right is superior and prior to the right of the 
respondent then the claim of homestead is immaterial. If 
she makes the claim of homestead on the theory that her 
husband was the owner of the property and that she as his 
wife is entitled to claim a homestead exemption as the head 
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5 
of the family she would not be entitled to prevail as the 
claim constitutes a variance from her complaint. In fact 
such testimony would disprove the allegations of her com-
plaint that she is "the owner in fee simple" of the property 
in dispute and she would therefore lose. 
Appellant also states on page 1 of her brief, as follows: 
"It is claimed that appellant was in possession 
of the real property at the time of the foreclosure 
suit and the wife of Ross Gigliotti, who was made a 
party to the Albergo suit. It is also claimed that 
appellant was the owner of the property by reason 
of the unrecorded deed". 
This last statement is in conflict with the plaintiff's 
testimony which is in part as follows: 
"I do not personally claim to be the owner of 
this property. I believe Ross is the owner. I am 
claiming as Ross' wife." (S. Ab. p. 2) 
The plaintiff's attorney likewise stated in open court 
that "we are not claiming under any deed." (Tr. p. 38). 
The appellant did not include this statement in his abstract 
and through an oversight we did not include it in the sup-
plemental abstract, but we believe that the court should con-
sider it anyway, although the statement of appellant her-
self is conclusive. 
A lis pendens was recorded by Albergo of the case of 
Albergo v. Gigliotti, et al, --Utah , 85 P. (2d) 107, 
on July 18, 1936, in Book 3-R of Miscellaneous records, page 
254, of the records of the county recorder of Carbon County, 
Utah. 
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On July 29, 1936, a quit-claim deed to the property in 
question was recorded wherein Maria Gigliotti and Felice 
W. Gigliotti were grantors and Rosario Gigliotti and Stella 
Felice Gigliotti, his wife, appellant herein, were grantees. 
This deed bears the date July 28, 1936. 
After the case of Albergo v. Gigliotti supra had been 
appealed to the Supreme Court by the Gigliotti's and the 
decision had been adverse to them and on February 18, 1939, 
a quit-claim deed was recorded wherein Rosario Gigliotti, 
Felice W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti were grantors and 
Stella Felice Gigliotti, appellant herein, was grantee. This 
deed bears the date July 17, 1936. 
It is our contention that this deed is a fraud and that 
the idea was conceived only after the Gigliotti's discov-
ered that the deed dated July 28, 1936, and recorded July 
29, 1936, would of necessity, have been delivered after the 
recording of the lis pendens above described. If this deed 
had been in existence on July 28, 1936, or on July 17, 1936, 
the deed dated July 28, 1936, would never have been exe-
cuted and delivered. The parties could not have forgotten 
the deed dated July 17, 1936, by July 28, 1936, if it had been 
executed and delivered and there would have been no ob-
ject in the execution and delivery of the second deed if the 
first one had been in existence. 
Quite a complete statement of the other facts in the 
case are contained in the Findings of Fact of the court be-
ginning on page 25 of the Abstract of Record. They are 
lengthy and instead of again setting them forth here we 
refer the court to them there. It would be well if the court 
would read them at this point. 
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In the paragraph numbered 2 on page 3 of appellant's 
brief she states as follo\vs: 
"2. On August 31, 1931, Felice W. Gigliotti 
and Maria Gigliotti, husband and wife, as vendors 
entered into a contract of sale with Rosario or Ross 
Gigliotti as purchaser whereby the vendors agreed 
to sell and the purchaser agreed to buy for the 
consideration therein named the property involv-
ed in this controversy and which contract was re-
corded in the year 1931 in the office of the County 
Recorder of Carbon County in Book 30, page 270. 
(Exhibit "A")" 
This statement is incorrect as said contract of sale de-
scribes only a portion of the property involved in this con-
troversy. 
A substantial part of the consideration for said con-
tract of sale was that Ross Gigliotti, the buyer and the hus-
band of appellant", assume, be liable for and pay for the 
Albergo mortgage. By doing so he became legally bound 
to pay the taxes levied and assessed against said property 
as shown by the first case. It held that the Gigliotti's, and 
Ross in particular, could not defeat Albergo's mortgage by 
allowing the property to be sold to the county and then by 
purchasing it at tax sale, because they, and Ross in par-
ticular, were under a duty to pay the taxes. The case does 
not hold what the appellant claims for it on pages 2 and 3 
of her brief except the duty of Ross to have paid the taxes 
might be inferred from appellant's statement. 
It seems appropriate at this point to set out some of 
the findings of the lower court as to the actions of the 
Gigliotti's and the part played by the appellant to cheat and 
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defraud Albergo of his mortgage indebtedness. A part of 
said findings are as follows: 
"15. That the said Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria 
Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti, prior to the 11 day 
of July, 1936, and with the knowledge and consent 
of the said Stella Felice Gigliotti, all repudiated 
and abandoned said 'Release and Contract of Sale' 
and released one another from liability under it; 
that at the time of the repudiation and abandon-
ment of said Release and Contract of Sale by the 
parties thereto, which was with the consent of the 
said Stella Felice Gigliotti, the mortgage indebted-
ness to Leopoldo Albergo had not been paid, which 
payment of said mortgage indebtedness was the 
main part of the consideration for said Release 
and Contract of Sale; that said repudiation and 
abandonment of said Release and Contract of Sale 
and the releasing of the parties obligated there-
under by each other was done in furtherance of the 
design to cheat and defraud the said Leopoldo 
Albergo of his mortgage indebtedness. That the 
said Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria Gigliotti and Rosario 
Gigliotti claimed to be the owners of said property 
under a new title initiated by the said quit-claim 
deed above described from Carbon County to the 
said Felice W. Gigliotti, Maria Gigliotti and Ro-
sario Gigliotti; that the said Felice W. Gigliotti, 
Maria Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti, with the 
knowledge and consent of the said Stella Felice 
Gigliotti, contended and claimed that said real 
property because of said quit-claim deed from Car-
bon County to them was free and clear of any lien 
of the mortgage to the said Leopoldo Albergo." 
(Abs. p. 33 & 34) 
The "Release and Contract of Sale" mentioned is the 
same document as that described in the paragraph num-
bered 2 on page 3 of appellant's brief. 
"16. That immediately upon the bringing of 
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the said foreclosure action by the said Leopoldo 
Albergo as hereinabove stated the said Rosario 
Gigliotti and his wife, Stella Felice Gigliotti, con-
sulted with their attorney, Harry W. Gustin, as to 
the defense of said action; that the said Stella 
Felice Gigliotti thereafter, and with her husband 
and in furtherance of his design and his parents 
design, to cheat and defraud the said Leopoldo 
Albergo, conferred with said attorney to defend 
said foreclosure action so commenced as above 
stated." (Abs. p. 34) 
"18. That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended 
said foreclosure action and claimed to be the sole 
owner of said property because of said quit-claim 
deed from Carbon County to himself and his par-
ents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and in 
his pleadings he made no claim to any title or in-
terest in and to said property because of said Re-
lease and Contract of Sale and claimed solely be-
cause of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that said 
Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations, 
and defended said action in said manner with the 
full knowledge and consent of the said Stella 
Felice Gigliotti." (Abs. p. 35) 
"24. That on the 7th day of February, 1939, 
the court in said Case No. 4553 made and entered 
its order of sale directing and requiring the Sheriff 
of Carbon County to sell said real property describ-
ed in paragraph 1 above at public auction; that 
notice of sale was duly given by the Sheriff of Car-
bon County in all particulars as provided by law 
that said property would 'be sold at sheriff's sale 
on the 4th day of March, 1939, at 10 o'clock a. m., 
on the steps of the Carbon County Court House, at 
Price, Carbon County, Utah'; that the said Stella 
Felice Gigliotti knew of said sale and that said 
sale of said property was to be free and clear of all 
encumbrances, claims and rights, of every name 
and nature, including any encumbrances, claims or 
rights that she had or claims to have in and to said 
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property; that said property at said time of saie 
was duly and regularly sold to Leopoldo Albergo; 
that said property so sold was never redeemed and 
after the redemption period had expired sheriff's 
deed was duly made, executed and delivered to the 
said Leopoldo Albergo conveying to him all of the 
property described in paragraph 1 above." (Abs. 
p. 37 & 38) 
"25. That the said Stella Felice Gigliotti knew 
at all times during the pendency of c·ase No. 4553, 
and thereafter, that the said Rosario Gigliotti 
claimed to be the owner of said real property under 
and by virtue of a new title initiated from Carbon 
County and not under said 'Release and Contract 
of Sale'; that she, at no time from the time of the 
commencement of said Case No. 4553 until after 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had de-· 
cided against her husband, made any claim of any 
kind or nature in and to said real property or any 
part thereof but on the contrary assisted her said 
. husband in his attempt to cheat and defraud the 
said Leopoldo Albergo as above described; that 
prior to the sheriff's sale up to September, 1939, 
the said Stella Felice Gigliotti made no claim of 
any kind or nature in and to said property except 
by the recording of the quit-claim deed claimed to 
be dated July 17, 1936, and which was recorded on 
February 18, 1939, in Book 3-T of Miscellaneous, 
page 353, of the records of Carbon County, Utah. 
(Abs. p. 38 & 39) 
"26. That the said Stella Felice Gigliotti now 
makes no claim in and to said real property in 
question because of any deed hereinabove describ-
ed, as testified to by her in said case, and claims 
only 'as the wife' of the said Rosario Gigliotti." 
(Abs. p. 39) 
The respondent herein contends in part as follows: 
1. That appellant, or Ross Gigliotti, acquired no rights 
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superior to respondent's by the two quit-claim deeds above 
mentioned because both of said quit-claim deeds were re .. 
corded after the recording of the lis pendens in the fore-
closure case. Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, Sec. 104-55-3. 
2. That Albergo is not charged with notice of any al-
leged "fee simple title" in appellant by reason of the fact 
that she was living on the premises with her husband, Ross 
Gigliotti, Albergo having the right to assume that she was 
on the premises merely by reason of the martial relation-
ship. 
3. That appellant and her attorney are bound by their 
representations in open court to the effect that they "are 
not claiming under any deed" and that they cannot and 
could not thereafter, and after cross examination, change 
their theory of the case and make a claim under a deed. 
4. That because of the fact that Felice W. Gigliotti, 
Maria Gigliotti and Rosario Gigliotti, prior to the 11th day 
of July, 1936, and with the knowledge and consent of the 
said Stella Felice Gigliotti all repudiated and abandoned 
said "Release and Contract of Sale" and released one an-
other from liability under it the appellant has no "inchoate 
interest" in said property and cannot impress it with a 
homestead claim because of said "Release and Contract of 
Sale." 
5. It is the settled law of this state that a wife has no 
"inchoate interest" in lands held by her husband under an 
uncompleted executory contract of sale. 
6. That appellant cannot prevail on the theory that she 
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is entitled to claim the property in question as a homestead 
under said "Release and Contract of Sale" because said 
"Release and Contract of Sale" describes only part of said 
property and because in her complaint she alleges that she 
is the owner of the fee simple title. 
7. That appellant cannot prevail under the tax deed 
from Carbon County to her husband and his parents, be-
. cause said deed was declared void as far as initiating any 
new title is concerned, amounting only to a payment of 
taxes, and the appellant claims a fee simple title, but she 
was not a grantee in said deed. 
8. That appellant is estopped to claim a homestead 
in the property in question as alleged in her reply or to 
claim a fee simple title because she knowingly cooperated 
with and assisted her husband in his attempt to defraud 
Albergo of his mortgage lien, and knew as found by the 
lower court : 
"18. That the said Rosario Gigliotti defend-
ed said foreclosure action and claimed to be the 
sole owner of said property because of said quit-
claim deed from Carbon County to himself and his 
parents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and 
in his pleadings he made no claim to any title or 
interest in and to said property because of said Re-
lease and Contract of Sale and claimed solely be-
cause of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that said 
Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations, 
and defended said action in said manner with the 
full knowledge and consent of the said Stella Felice 
Gigliotti." (Abs. p. 35) 
9. That after so cooperating with and assisting her 
husband in his attempt to defraud Albergo and knowing 
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the representations he had made as to his title she sat idlely 
by until after sheriff's sale without asserting her alleged 
title and is thereby estopped from making any claim to said 
property. 
10. That as this is an equity case and the appellant 
is not in court with clean hands the court will not aid her 
in her claim. 
11. That the court likewise will not aid her in per-
petrating a fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
The appellant on page 8 of her brief states that "Any 
interest in property and even possession alone is sufficient 
to maintain" a quiet title action and cites three cases in 
support of said contention. 
These cases do not hold what the plaintiff states that 
they do, as a reading of them will readily show. The mat-
ter, however, is not important as the plaintiff has alleged 
in her complaint that she is the owner of a fee simple title. 
She is bound by that. 
We have read all of the authorities cited by appellant 
in her brief but none of them apply or are in point in the 
case at bar. 
We do not have access to the case of Fahie v. Pressey, 
2 Ore. 23, 80 Am. Dec. 401, cited on page 10 of appellant's 
brief but a reading of what appellant says concerning said 
case shows that it has no application here. So far as the 
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statement of facts show, the property was in the name of 
the wife and that fact must have been of record or there 
was something that advised the mortgagee of that fact. He 
foreclosed only against the husband. We note that she has 
quoted the following portion from said brief: 
"To entitle a party to relief in such cases, the 
facts must not only be material, but must be such 
that he could not with reasonable diligence have 
obtained knowledge of them. Where there is neith-
er accident nor mistake, fraud nor misrepresenta-
tion, equity affords no relief to a party on the 
ground that he has lost his remedy at law through 
mere ignorance of a fact, the knowledge of which 
might have been obtained with due diligence." 
There is no way that Albergo through due diligence 
could have ascertained that appellant herein was the holder 
of an unrecorded deed. The purpose of our recording sta-
tutes is to require persons who hold deeds to property to 
have them recorded or lose when intervening rights arise. 
There was no lack of diligence on Albergo's part in this case. 
We also claim as will be hereinafter argued that appellant 
in this case assisted her husband in misrepresenting the 
true state of facts in an attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon 
Albergo. 
We have also read the case of Bank of United States v. 
Lee, 13 Pet. 107. This case has absolutely no application to 
the case at bar. The facts involved and the decision are 
as follows: 
"R. B. L. in 1809, then residing in Virginia, for 
a valuable consideration, made a conveyance in 
trust for the benefit of his wife, of certain personal 
property and slaves, which deed was duly recorded 
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according to the provisions of the act of the Legis-
lature of Virginia. The property thus conveyed, 
remained in the possession of the husband and wife 
while they resided in Virginia; and in 1814, R. B. L. 
removed to the District of Columbia, with his wife 
and family, and brought with him the slaves and 
property conveyed in trust for his wife. In 1817, 
R. B. L. borrowed a sum of money of the Bank of 
the United States, on his promissory note, indorsed 
by one of the trustees named in the deed of trust of 
1809. At the time the loan was made, R. B. L. exe-
cuted a deed of trust of eleven slaves, and among 
them were the slaves and the household furniture 
conveyed by the deed of 1809, to secure the bank 
for the amount of the loan. In 1827, R. B. L. died, 
entirely insolvent. During his residence in Wash-
ington, being in reduced circumstances, he sold 
some of the slaves, conveyed by the deed of 1809, 
for the support of his family; without objection by 
his wife or her trustees. In 1834, the debt to the 
bank being unpaid, a bill was filed aginst Mrs. E. L., 
the wife of R. B. L., and the trustees in order to 
compel the surrender of the remaining slaves and 
the household furniture, to the trustee for the 
bank, for the sale of the same, to satisfy the debt 
due to the bank. Held, that the deed of 1809, vest-
ing the property in Mrs. L.'s trustees, was effect-
ual, according to the laws of Virginia, to protect 
the title thereto, against the ·subsequent creditors, 
or purchasers from R. B. Lee; and that the removal 
of R. B. L. and his wife into the District of Co-
lumbia with the property conveyed to the trustees 
for the use of Mrs. L., did not affect or impair the 
validity of the deed of trust. 
"A liberal construction should be given to the 
clause of the Virginia statute for the suppression of 
fraud. This is the well established rule in the con-
struction of the statute of Elizabeth, which the 
first section of the Virginia statute substantially 
adopts. 
"If A sells, or conveys his lands or slaves to B, 
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and then produces to another his previous paper 
title, and obtains credit on the goods or lands, by 
pledging them for money loaned, he is guilty of 
fraud; and if the true owner stands by, and does 
not make his title known, he will be bound to make 
good the contract, on the principle that he who 
holds his peace when he ought to have spoken, shall 
not be heard now that he should be silent. He is 
deemed, in equity, a party to the fraud." 
Sloane v. Lucas, et at, 79 P. 949, (Wash) 
There is no question involved in this case as to 
the knowledge of the mortgagee as to the title of 
the land. The purchaser had a deed and was, 
therefore, seised of the property, and of course, his 
wife should have been made a party defendant. 
In the case at bar Ross Gigliotti, the husband of the 
appellant herein, did not have any deed which showed of 
record and of which Albergo had knowledge, and the appel-
lant herself had no deed which appeared of record and of 
which the defendant Albergo had knowledge. Ross Gigliotti 
had been purchasing a part of the property in question under 
a contract of sale but he and the sellers, his parents, had 
abandoned and ·released one another from said contract, 
with the knowledge and consent of the appellant as will be 
more fully discussed hereinafter. 
Northwestern Trust Co. v. Ryan, 132 N. W. 202, 
(Minn): 
This case is likewise one in which the title was 
conveyed to the husband before the foreclosure pro-
ceedings were commenced. The mortgage made 
the husband a party defendant in the case but 
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failed to include the wife. It is obvious that this 
case has no application. 
Kursheedt, et al., v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 23 
N. E. 473, (New York): 
The portion of the case quoted by the appellant 
states that the "right" of dower "attaches on the 
land when the seisin and the marriage relation are 
concurrent." 
Ross Gigliotti never became seised of the property in 
question or any part of it prior to the recording of the lis 
pendens. Appellant is likewise foreclosed from making a 
claim of inchoate interest in the property because in her 
complaint she alleges she is the owner of a fee simple title, 
which is something entirely different from an inchoate in-
terest in real property, the title of which is in her husband 
and not in herself. 
Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248, P. 481, (Utah): 
This case does not involve the rights of a mar-
ried woman. In fact the court speaks of Louise 
Jensen as Miss Louise Jensen. :She had been deed-
ed part of the property in question and her deed 
had been properly recorded prior to the bringing 
of the foreclosure action. The case has absolutely 
no application to the case at bar in any particular. 
Boucofski v. Jacobson, 36 U. 165, 104 P. 117, 
and 
Halloway v. Wetzel, 86 U. 387, 45 P. (2d) 565: 
We are at a loss to see how appellant claims 
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these cases apply. 
Appellant did not record any deed to her until February 
18, 1939. If she had taken and kept possession of the 
property Albergo would have been required within the lim-
itation period to bring an action against her for possession 
or be barred. The note and mortgage were not barred and no 
attempt is being made here to require her to pay them. 
Appellant has failed to point out in her brief which section 
of the statute of limitations applies and why it does so. We 
are certain that it has no application whatsoever. 
On page 19 of appellant's brief she has quoted the fol-
lowing: 
42 C. J.,-Mortgages-Section 1567 P. 50: 
"If the mortgagor, after the execution of the 
mortgage, makes a conveyance of the mortgaged 
property, and the conveyance is not recorded before 
foreclosure proceedings are commenced, and the 
mortgagee is not notified of the grantee's interest, 
by his being in possession or otherwise, such 
grantee need not be made a defendant, and a judg-
ment against the mortgagor is conclusive against 
him." 
This is a correct statement of law as we under-
stand it and it completely answers against the 
plaintiff any claim as to the validity of her unre-
corded deed giving her a title superior to Albergo's. 
He was not ·notified as to her interest in the 
property and we will hereinafter discuss appellant's 
contention that the fact that she was on the proper-
ty was sufficient to put him on notice. 
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We will now present our contentions concerning the 
case in order : 
I. 
THAT APPELLANT, OR ROSS GIGLIOTTI, 
ACQUIRED NO RIGHTS SUPERIOR TO RE-
SPONDENT'S BY THE TWO QUIT-C.LAIM 
DEEDS ABOVE MENTIONED BECAUSE BO·TH 
OF SAID QUIT-CLAIM DEEDS WERE RECORD-
ED AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE LIS 
PENDENS IN THE FORE·CLOSURE CASE. 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 104-55-3, 
provides as follows: 
"No person holding a conveyance from or un-
der the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or 
having a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien 
does not appear of record in the proper office at 
the time of the commencement of the action, need 
be made a party to such action, and the judg-
ment therein rendered, and the proceedings therein 
had, are as conclusive against the party holding 
such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had 
been made a party to the action." 
At the time the lis pendens in the foreclosure action 
was recorded the property was shown in the name of Felice 
W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti his wife. Said lis pendens 
was recorded on July 18, 1936. On July 29, 1936, a quit-
claim deed dated July 28, 1936, was recorded wherein Felice 
W. Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti quit-claimed the property 
in question to Ross Gigliotti and Stella Felice Gigliotti his 
wife, appellant herein. On February 18, 1939, a quit-claim 
deed was recorded wherein Rosario Gigliotti, Felice W. 
Gigliotti and Maria Gigliotti, quit-claimed the property in 
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question to Stella Felice Gigliotti. This deed is claimed to 
be dated July 17, 1936. These are the oniy deeds to appel-
lant in this case and the only source of any "fee simple 
title" in her. Because of the statute above quoted she can-
not prevail in this case under either of said deeds. 
II. 
THAT ALBE.RGO IS NOT CHARGED WITH 
NOTICE OF ANY ALLEGED "FEE SIMPLE 
TITLE" IN APPELLANT BY REASON OF THE 
FACT THAT SHE WAS LIVING ON THE PREM-
ISES WITH HER HUSBAND, ROSS GIGLIOTTI, 
ALBER.GO HAVING THE RIGHT TO ASSUME 
THAT SHE WAS ON THE PREMISES MERELY 
BY REASON OF THE MARTIAL RELATION-
SHIP. 
Tiffany on Real Property - ( 2d) Edition, Vol. 2, 
S.ection 571, at page 2233: 
"That the property is occupied by a married 
couple would not ordinarily put a purchaser from 
the husband on inquiry as to the adverse interest 
in the wife, he having the right to assume that she 
is on the premises merely by reason of the martial 
relationship." 
Langley v. Pulliam, et al., 162 Ala. 142, 50 So. 365: 
"Where a husband conveyed a lot to his wife 
by deed, which was not recorded, and there was no 
change of possession, even if the husband and wife, 
who lived together, afterwards lived on the lot con-
veyed, it would not afford notice of the wife's 
rights as against those claiming as bona fide pur-
chasers through the husband. 
"Where a husband conveyed a lot to his wife 
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and executed a mortgage on it, which was assigned 
before the deed was filed for record, and the lot 
was purchased at foreclosure after the recording of 
the deed the purchaser would have been exempt 
from the effect of notice to the mortgagee of the 
existence of the wife's title before the mortgage 
was executed if there had been proof of a consider-
ation paid for the mortgage." 
Storz v. Clarke, 221 N. W. 101, 117 Neb. 488: 
"Joint occupancy of premises as family home 
did not impart notice of wife's claim of any inter-
est other than homestead right." 
III. 
THAT APPELLANT AND HER ATTO·RNEY 
ARE BOUND BY THEIR REPRESENTATIONS 
IN OPEN COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY 
"ARE NOT CLAIMING UNDER ANY DEED" 
AND THAT THEY CANNOT AND COULD NOT 
THEREAFTER, AND AFTER CROSS EXAMINA-
TION, CHANGE THEIR THEORY OF THE CASE 
AND MAKE A CLAIM UNDER A DEED. 
The appellant was the first witness that was called· to 
testify in the case. She and her attorney had apparently 
changed their minds since the filing of the complaint as to 
what she should claim as her source of title. She stated in 
part, as follows: 
"I do not personally claim to be the owner of 
this property. I believe Ross is the owner. I 
am claiming as Ross's wife." (S. Ab. p. 2) 
The plaintiff's attorney stated in open court, as follows: 
"We are not claiming under any deed." (Tr. 
p. 38). 
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So far as the record showed the only deed to Ross was 
the one from his parents to him and the appellant herein. 
She was a grantee in it with him. The deed, however, was 
recorded after the lis pendens, and, of course, would give her 
no rights. It appeared that the only claim that she could 
be making would be under the "Release and Contract of 
Sale" above described. 
We cross examined her on the deed that she had caused 
to be recorded on February 18, 1939, wherein she was the 
grantee. This was done to show that at that time she 
was making no claim under said Release and Contract of 
Sale and as some proof of our contention that said Release 
and Contract of ;Sale had been abandoned by the parties 
to it, with appellant's knowledge and consent. If said 
deed was actually executed and delivered on July 17, 1936, 
the day before the foreclosure action was started, it shows 
conclusively as far as appellant is concerned that prior to 
the commencement of the foreclosure she was claiming a 
fee simple title herself and not any right under said Re-
lease and Contract of Sale, and bears out our contention that 
said Release and Contract of Sale had been completely 
abandoned by the parties to it with her knowledge and con-
sent. 
The deed was introduced to explain the conversation 
and to show that Mrs. Gigliotti was not making any claim 
under said Release and Contract of Sale. 
After said quit-claim deed had been introduced and re-
ceived into evidence, the appallant was permitted, over 
Albergo's objections, to amend her reply by addition of the 
following thereto: 
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"That on or about the 17 day of July, 1936 
Rosario Gigliotti and Felice Gigliotti and Maria 
Gigliotti conveyed the property in question, by 
quit-claim deed, to the plaintiff, Stella Felice 
Gigliotti, as shown by the Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1 heretofore offered and received in evidence 
in this case." 
This was certainly improper after her statement that 
she was not claiming under any deed and the statement of 
her attorney that they were not claiming under any deed. 
We believe, however, that it constituted an abandonment 
of any homestead claim as set forth in her reply as the 
homestead matter was based on her rights because her 
husband was a purchaser under the "Release and Contract 
of Sale." She could not and cannot claim under both as 
they are entirely inconsistent matters. 
IV. 
THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT 
FELICE W. GIGLIOTTI, MARIA GIGLIOTTI 
AND ROSS GIGLIOTTI, PRIOR TO THE 11TH 
DAY OF JULY, 1936, AND WITH THE KNOW-
LEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE SAID STELLA 
FELICE GIGLIOTTI, ALL REPUDIATED AND 
ABANDONED SAID "RELEAS:E AND CO,N-
TRACT OF SALE" AND RELEASED ONE AN-
OTHER FROM LIABILITY UNDER IT, THE 
APPELLANT HAS NO "INCHOATE INTEREST" 
IN SAID PROPERTY, AND CANNOT IMPRESS 
IT WITH A HOMESTEAD CLAIM BECAUSE OF 
SAID "RELEASE AND CONTRAC'T OF ;SALE." 
Finding of Fact No. 18 of the Court is, as follows: 
"That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended 
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said foreclosure action and claimed to be the sole 
owner of said property because of said quit-claim 
deed from Carbon County to himself and his par-
ents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and in 
his pleadings he made no claim to any title or in-
terest in and to said property because of said Re-
lease and Contract of Sale and claimed solely be-
cause of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that said 
Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, representations, 
and defended said action in said manner with the 
full knowledge and consent of the said Stella 
Felice Gigliotti." 
Ross Gigliotti at the trial of the first case in the be-
ginning of the trial denied the existence of said Release 
and Contract of Sale ·and admitted it only after Albergo 
had proven it conclusively against him. Ross Gigliotti 
claimed that the deed from Carbon County initiated an en-
tirely new source of title and for that reason the lien of 
the Albergo mortgage was defeated. 
Ross Gigliotti had not performed the terms of said 
Release and Contract of Sale .bY paying off the Albergo 
mortgage as he agreed to do in said Release and Contract 
but in the attempt to defeat the lien of Albergo's mortgage 
the property was allowed to go to Carbon County for the 
purpose of "initiating a new title". And to strengthen the 
matter the parents of Ross Gigliotti gave him and his wife 
the quit..-claim deed, which was recorded after the lis pen-
dens. These matters alone show that the "Release and 
Contract of Sale" was abandoned by the parties in question 
and they all agreed to release one another from liability 
under it. 
The claim that appellant makes that the quit-claim 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
deed to her alone by the other three Gigliotti's, was prior 
to the commencement of the foreclosure action, shows that 
said Release and Contract of Sale was abandoned with her 
knowledge and consent. She was not a party to said Release 
and Contract of Sale and it did not provide that title be 
conveyed to her. She was assisting her husband in attempt-
ing to defraud Albergo and took this deed as an added pre-
caution. He was claiming under the deed from Carbon 
County, and with her knowledge and consent. The ap-
pellant and her husband, Ross Gigliotti, conferred with 
Mr. Gustin from the time the first action was started. Flora 
Tolman, witness for appellant, testified that she was em-
ployed as a secretary in Mr. Gustin's office and concerning 
the deed to Mrs. Gigliotti recorded on February 18, 1939, 
and as to Mrs. Gigliotti being in Mr. Gustin's office, as fol-
lows: 
"The reason why it hadn't been recorded pre-
viously is because Mr. Gustin hadn't made up his 
mind that it should be recorded or not. I know that 
the deed had been there for considerable time be-
fore it was recorded and I am sure that it could 
have been there as long as w year and it might 
have been there two years, but I cannot say posi-
tively. I remember Mrs. Gigliotti being in the 
office in July after the suit was started. I don't 
remember seeing her in the office as far back as 
the time whe.n I first saw the deed but she may 
have been. I know she was in the office several 
times. The suit that I refer to is the foreclosure 
suit. She carne to town with Mr. Gigliotti and she 
came in the office. (Abs. p. 60 and S. Abs. p. 3). 
Mrs. Gigliotti herself testified in part as follows: 
"I do not remember the exact date that I de-
livered the deed to Mr. Gustin but I delivered it 
to Mr. Gustin at his office. When I went to Salt 
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Lake to see Mr. Gustin, Ross Gigliotti took me in 
and he was present during the entire transaction." 
(Abs.- p. 56) 
"I delivered the deed to Mr. Gustin at his 
.. office. I don't remember if it isn't a fact that Ross 
Gigliotti delivered it to him." (8. Abs. p. 2). 
This testimony shows conclusively that Mrs. Gigliotti 
knew what was going on in the first case from the begin-
ning; that she was conspiring with her husband to defeat 
the lien of Albergo's mortgage, and that the abandoning of 
said Release and Contract of Sale and the releasing of all 
parties thereto from liability was done with her knowledge 
and consent. 
A further fact that said Release and Contract of Sale 
had been abandoned and the parties thereto released is, that 
said Contract describes only a part of the property in ques .. 
tion, and Ross Gigliotti in case No. 4553 was claiming all of 
the property under the quit-clai!fl deeds from Carbon County 
and his parents, and the appellant herein is likewise claim-
ing all of the property and not a part of it. 
That a wife can consent that her husband abandon a 
contract under which. she might have some rights is too 
elementary to require· citation of authorities. All rights 
under the Release and Contract of Sale had gone out of ex-
istence and been terminated prior to the commencement of 
the foreclosure action if appellant's contention is correct, 
that a quit-claim deed was made, executed and delivered 
to her, prior to the time of the commencement of the fore ... 
closure suit. This fact alone precludes her from making 
a claim of homestead under said Release and Contract of 
Sale. 
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Anderson v. Cosman 72 N. W. 523: 
"The vendee under a land contract occupied 
the land, with his family, as a homestead. Owing 
to his inability to make the required payments, he 
surrendered the contract to the vendor, who sold 
and conveyed the land to a third person, and the 
original vendee leased the premises from this 
grantee. Held, that by acquiescing in this arrange-
ment, with full knowledge of the facts, the wife 
of the original vendee abandoned her homestead 
rights in the land." 
v. 
IT IS THE SETTLED LAW OF THIS STATE 
THAT A WIFE HAS NO "INCHOATE INTER-
EST" IN LANDS HELD BY HER HUSBAND UN-
DER AN UNCOMPLETED EXECUTORY CON-
TRACT OF SALE. 
66 A. L. R. 67: Annotation. 
"In jurisdictions where the husband must be 
seized of the legal title, or of such a complete equit-
able title that it will be deemed an estate of inherit-
ance, to entitle the wife to dower, it is generally 
held that a wife has no dower in lands held by the 
husband at the time of his death under an uncom-
pleted executory contract of sale." 
See UTAH CASE in support of said 
statement. McNeil v. McNeil 61 U. 141, 
211 P. 988: 
VI. 
THAT APPELLANT CANNOT PREVAIL ON 
THE THEORY THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO 
CLAIM THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION AS A 
HOMESTEAD UNDER SAID "RELEASE AND 
CONTRACT OF SALE" BECAUSE SAID "RE-
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LEAS.E AND CONTRACT OF SALE" DESCRIBES 
ONLY PART OF SAID PROPERTY AND BE-
CAUSE IN HER COMPLAINT SHE ALLEGES 
THAT SHE IS THE OWNER OF THE FEE 
SIMPLE TITLE. 
The description of the property included in said Re-
lease and Contract of Sale, is as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is 1226 feet East 
of the Northwest corner of Section 13, Township 13 
South, Range 9 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, 
thence South 157 feet, thence North 79 degrees 10 
minutes East a distance of 270 feet more or less to 
the County road right-of-way, thence northwest-
erly along said right-of-way to the North line of 
said Section 13, thence West to the place of begin-
ning; 
and it is only a portion of the property that is involved in 
this action. The said property involved in this action is 
described, as follows: 
Commencing at a point 74 feet East of the 
Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of the 
Northwest quarter Section 13 Township 13 South, 
Range 9 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, and run-
ning thence West 436 feet; thence South 333 feet; 
thence North 85 degrees 20 minutes East along line 
of fence 455 feet; thence North 3 degrees 20 min-
utes West 296 feet, to the place of beginning, being 
two and three-fifths acres of land in the Northwest 
quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 13, 
Township 13 South, Range 9 East, Salt Lake Merid-
ian, .and three-fifths acres in the Northeast quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of Section 13, together 
with and including all improvements thereon and 
all rights and appurtenances thereunto belonging 
or thereunto in anywise appertaining. 
Also, beginning at a point which is 74 feet 
East and 46 feet South 3 degrees 20 minutes East 
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of the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of Section 13, Township 
13 South, Range 9 East, Salt Lake Meridian; thence 
South 3 degrees 20 minutes East 250 feet; thence 
North 86 degrees 50 minutes East 242.2 feet; 
thence Northwesterly on a curved line along old 
fence to the point of beginning, containing eight-
tenths of an acre, together with one acre of pri-
mary water right and also all improvements there-
on and all rights and appurtenances thereunto be-
longing or thereunto in any wise appertaining; also, 
all water rights owned by the mortgagors of what-
ever nature, kind and description and however 
evidenced, used upon the above mentioned and 
described parcel of land. 
VII. 
THAT APPELLANT CANNOT PREVAIL 
UNDER THE TAX DEED FROM CARBON 
COUNTY TO HER HUSBAND AND HIS PAR-
ENTS BECAUSE SAID DE.ED WAS DECLARED 
VOID AS FAR AS INITIATING ANY NEW 
TITLE IS CONCERNED, AMOUNTING ONLY 
TO A PAYMENT OF THE ·TAXES, AND THE 
APPELLANT CLAIMS A FEE SIMPLE TITLE, 
BUT SHE WAS NOT A GRANTEE IN SAID 
DEED. 
Apparently, and so far as we know, appellant since the 
commencement of this action has not, and does not now, 
make a claim because of the tax .deed from Carbon County. 
Said deed was declared absolutely void in the other case and 
that it amounted merely to a payment of the taxes and a 
redemption of the property from tax sale. She also cannot 
claim anything under the tax deed because in her com-
plaint she alleges to be the owner of a fee simple title and 
in her reply, as amended, she claims to be the owner of 
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said fee simple title because of the quit-claim deed to her 
personally, which was given to her by the other three 
Gigliotti's and which was recorded on February 18, 1939. 
VIII. 
THAT APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED TO 
CLAIM A HOMESTEAD IN THE PRO·PERTY IN 
QUESTION AS ALLEGED IN HER REPLY OR 
TO CLAIM A FEE SIMPLE TITLE BECAUSE 
SHE KNOWINGLY COOPERATED WITH AND 
ASSISTED HER HUSBAND IN HIS ATTEMPT 
TO DEFRAUD ALBERGO OF HIS MORTGAGE 
LIEN, AND KNEW AS FOUND BY THE LOWER 
COURT: 
"18. That the said Rosario Gigliotti defended 
said foreclosure action and claimed to be the sole 
owner of said property because of said quit-claim 
deed from Carbon County to himself and his par-
ents dated July 11, 1936; that at said trial and in 
his pleadings he made no claim to any title or 
interest in and to said property because of said 
Release and Contract of Sale, and claimed solely 
because of the deeds hereinabove set forth; that 
said Rosario Gigliotti made said claims, repre-
sentations, and defended said action in said man-
ner with the full knowledge and consent of the 
said Stella Felice Gigliotti." (Abs. p. 35) 
The same testimony quoted under No. IV above shows 
conclusively that the appellant knowingly cooperated with 
and assisted her husband in his attempt to defraud Albergo 
of his mortgage lien. 
It has been the claim of appellant throughout this case 
that it would be necessary for her to have actively done 
something before she can be estopped and that she could not 
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be estopped by merely sitting idlely by. As the testimony 
conclusively shows that she actively cooperated with and 
assisted her husband we will not take the time of the court 
by citing authorities. 
IX. 
THAT AFTER SO COOPERATING WITH 
AND ASSISTING HER HUSBAND IN HIS AT-
TEMPT TO DEFRAUD ALBERGO AND KNOW-
ING THE REPRESENTArriONS HE HAD MADE 
AS 'fO HIS TITLE SHE SAT IDLEL Y BY UNTIL 
AFTER SHERIFF'S 1SALE WITHOUT ASSER.T-
ING HER ALLEGED TITLE AND IS THEREBY 
ESTOPPED FROM MAKING ANY CLAIM TO 
SAID PROPERTY. 
The testimony quoted above shows conclusively that 
Mrs. Gigliotti knew of the foreclosure action and that she 
assisted her husband in his defense of it, and of necessity 
must have known of the sheriff's sale. It was stipulated in 
the case, as follows : 
"That prior to the 1st day of September, 
1939," - the date of the sheriff's sale - "the 
sheriff was not notified by Mrs. Gigliotti or any-
one acting for her that she claimed an interest 
in the property." (Abs. p. 65) 
On the general topic of estoppel to assert homestead, 
we refer the court to that topic, which is No. 9, under the 
heading of homestead in 26 Am. Jur. 
26 Am. Jur. - Hontestead - Section 212: 
If a mortgagee can show that a homestead 
claimant acted with intention to deceive him he is 
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entitled to prevail. 
X 
THAT AS THIS lS AN EQ·UITY CASE AND 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT IN COURT WITH 
CLEAN HANDS THE COURT WILL NOT AID 
HER IN HER CLAIM. 
XI. 
THAT Tl-IE COURT LIKEWISE WILL NOT 
AID HER IN PERPETRATING A FRAUD. 
These two are closely interwoven. All of the evidence 
introduced shows conclusively that the appellant herein as-
sisted and cooperated with her husband in an attempt to 
defeat and defraud Albergo of this mortgage lien. 
"HE WHO c·OMES INTO EQUITY MUST 
COME WITH CLEAN HANDS." 
Hensley v. Maxwell~ (Okla) 44 P. (2d) 60: 
"Homestead exemptions cannot be used as 
shield for fraud." 
Principles of Equity - Clark - Section 30: 
"He who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands. This maxim is closely related to the 
one just preceding in that it is founded upon 'good 
conscience;' but it differs from that one in placing 
an absolute bar gainst relief instead of requiring 
only the giving of a conditional decree. Unlike 
the other maxim, too, there is an analogous maxim 
in the common law and Roman law, which is us-
ually given in the Latin form: Ex turpi causa 
non oritur action; of which the following is a free 
translation; 'no cause of action will arise out of an 
illegal transaction.' " 
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We would now like to discuss one or two other features 
of this case. There is much authority to the effect that it 
is not necessary to make a married woman a party defend-
ant in a case when she does not have the legal title to the 
property unless she could have claimed dower because of 
the right of her husband to the property. 
Skillen et al v. Harris et al., (Mont) 3 P (2d) 1054: 
"Wife whose dower right was not involved in 
foreclosure action held proper but not necessary 
party." 
We must distinguish between a necessary and a proper 
party to an action. There is authority to the effect that 
Ross Gigliotti was likewise a proper party to the foreclosure 
action but not a necessary party. 
Bennett v. U. S. Land, Title and Legacy Company, 
(Ariz) 141 P. 717: 
"A party holding an executory contract to 
purchase mortgaged property, executed by the 
mortgagor subsequent to the giving and recording 
of the mortgage and before a foreclosure is com-
menced is not a necessary party defendant to fore-
closure proceedings." 
"In ejectment plaintiff must recover upon the 
strength of his own title." 
It is elementary law that the appellant in this case to 
secure a decree quieting title to the property in her must 
prevail upon the strength of her own title. We call to the 
court's attention that the appellant offered no testimony 
whatever by deed, abstract or otherwise, showing any source 
of title in herself or Ross Gigliotti prior to the institution 
of the foreclosure action. 
Bancroft Code Pleading - page 3299: 
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"The mortgagor represents the interests of 
the grantee in the unrecorded conveyance and 
when the court acquires jurisdiction of the mort-
gagor in the action to foreclose it also acquires jur-
isdiction of all persons who hold unrecorded con-
veyances or contracts from him so as to conclude 
them by the judgment entered in the foreclosure 
suit. By standing idlely by and permitting the 
action to be prosecuted without intervention upon 
his part, such granteee in effect consents to be rep-
resented by his grantor and is estopped from as-
serting his title. against the purchaser at the fore-
closure sale, or those in privity with him." 
Even if the Release and Contract of Sale had not been 
abandoned it is very doubtful if appellant could claim a 
homestead so as to defeat Albergo's mortgage. 
Section 38-0-1, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933: 
Homestead Exemption - Exceptions. 
"A homestead consisting of lands, appurte-
nances and improvements, which lands may be 
in one or more localities, not exceeding in value 
with the appurtenances and improvements thereon 
the sum of $2,000 for the head of the family, and 
the further sum of $750 for the spouse, and $300 
for each other member of the family, shall be ex-
empt from judgment lien and from execution or 
forced sale, except upon the following obligations: 
(1) taxes accruing and levied thereon; and (2) 
judgments obtained on debts secured by ·lawful 
mortgage on the premises and on debts created for 
the purchase price thereof." 
The largest part of the consideration for the Release 
and Contract of Sale was Ross Gigliotti's promise and 
agreement to pay the Albergo mortgage, which would clear 
the mortgage from the property which he was buying and 
(, 
the property which his parents were keeping and were not 
sel~ing to ·him. Albergo's judgment of foreclosure was 
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therefore obtained on a debt secured by a lawful mortgage 
on the premises, and Ross Gigliotti in his contract to pur-
chase likewise assumed and agreed to pay said mortgage 
and his indebtedness under it thereby became a debt created 
for the purchase price thereof. 
The law is clear under that section that Mrs. Gigliotti 
cannot claim a homestead to defeat Albergo's mortgage. 
Section 217, 29 C. J. 866 : 
"Under most homestead provisions if a part of 
the consideration for the conveyance of the land 
is- the purchaser's agreement to pay a debt of the 
vendor to a third person, the latter may enforce 
his rights in preference to the homestead claim." 
19 R. C. L. Section 334 : 
"The wife, where the mortg·age is given for 
the purchase money of land sold, is not a necessary 
party to a bill to foreclose the mortgage. In such 
case, the seizin of the husband passes from him eo 
instanti that he acquires it, and being immediately 
revested in the grantor, the widow cannot claim 
dower in the premises. If then the widow could not 
be endowable, the wife, while the husband is living 
can have no interest in the premises, and conse-
quently she need not be a party to the foreclos-
ure." 
89 A. L. R. 531: Annotation. 
"With few exceptions it is held that one in 
possession of land under a contract of purchase 
has a sufficient equitable interest therein on which 
to claim a homestead therein except as against the 
unpaid vendor or one claiming through him or 
under the purchase money obligation, and it ap-
pears that that the question of how much of the 
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purchase price remains unpaid, whether all or part, 
is not a subject of inquiry in deciding such cases. 
See many cases cited and also the Utah 
case- Hansen v. Mauss. (1912) 40 U. 361 
121 P. 605. 
42 c. J. 53: 
"As dower is not claimable against a purchase-
money mortgage the wife need not be joined in pro-
ceedings to foreclose a mortgage of that kind." 
A contention was made at the time of the trial of the 
case that Albergo could not claim fraud on the part of Mrs. 
Gigliotti to defeat her claim of homestead because the fraud 
claim was not pleaded. There is nothing to such a conten-
tion because the only claimed source of title pleaded by the 
appellant is in her reply and the homestead matter is like-
wise first pleaded there. They are affirmative matters and 
pleadings and all defenses to affirmative matters set forth 
in a reply can be presented. 
In closing we wish to point out to the court that the 
only purpose of the quit-claim deed from the three Gigliotti's 
to Stella Felice Gigliotti which was not recorded until Feb-
ruary 18, 1939, could only have been for the purpose of 
deeding the title to the property out of the mortgagors in 
an attempt to defraud Albergo. This fact alone shows the 
active cooperation of the appellant in all proceedings and 
her knowledge of them from the beginning. 
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARL D. GIBSON, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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